This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them. In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...

Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our...

Consider a society with two sectors (issues or objects) that faces a design problem. Suppose that the sector-2 dimension of the design problem is fixed and represented by a mechanism Γ², and that the designer operates under this constraint for institutional reasons. A sector-1 mechanism Γ¹...

This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them. In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...

This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them.In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...

We study a dynamic public capital accumulation model with infinitely-lived agents who follow the standard discounted utility model in their roles as consumers and voters. Saving policies are determined sequentially, period-by-period, by majority voting. When there is discounting heterogeneity,...