We study a modification of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model in which the bank may hold a liquid asset, some depositors see sunspots that could lead them to run, and all depositors have incomplete information about the bank's ability to survive a run. The incomplete information means that the...

We study a modification of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model in which the bank may hold a liquid asset, some depositors see sunspots that could lead them to run, and all depositors have incomplete information about the bank's ability to survive a run. The incomplete information means that the...

I develop a theoretical model for investigating the cost of failure to commit in the provision of bailouts to financial institutions. When a financial institution fails, the fiscal authority often deviates from its ex ante no-bailout commitment: the ex post best response is to bail out. The...

I develop a theoretical model for investigating the cost of failure to commit in the provision of bailouts to financial institutions. When a financial institution fails, the fiscal authority often deviates from its ex ante no-bailout commitment: the ex post best response is to bail out. The...

During the last decades a consensus has emerged that it is impossible to disentangle liquidity shocks from solvency shocks. As a consequence the classical lender of last resort rules, as defined by Thornton and Bagehot, based on lending to solvent illiquid institutions appear ill-suited to this...

Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking...