behavior in the first-price auction, where both risk-aversion and loss aversion induce ‘overbidding.' We then show that the … nonparametric utility function and loss aversion coefficient are point-identified by the experiment data with exogenous variation in …

We study the impact of colors of paintings on prices in the art auction market and incorporate color attributes of non …

If all potential buyers participate in a first-price auction, then (theoretically) the auction price weakly exceeds the … posted-price mechanism to auction. We aim to explain this empirical contradiction in terms of partial participation of the … buyers in auction, prompted by impatience and dissuasion. Auction in internet often requires waiting, and hence many …

untrusting individual is expected to respond adversely. We design an experiment to test this hypothesis. Using a Trust Game, we …

We investigate the impact of using a clear scoring rule in a sealed bid multi-dimensional (A+B) procurement auction, as … concealing the scoring rule affected buyers. Using an experiment, we analyze the effect of transparently communicating the …

An increasingly studied auction format is the asymmetric procurement auction, which features an advantaged bidder … auctions, our laboratory experiment tests whether two information asymmetries (more precise cost estimates and knowledge about … bidder performance in a procurement auction where the only asymmetry is due to a cost. In this setting, analytical benchmarks …

Renegotiation is a common practice in procurement auctions which allows for post-auction price adjustments and is … nominally intended to deal with the problem that sellers might underestimate the eventual costs of a project during the auction …

mirrors real construction procurement auctions, our laboratory experiment tests the impact of the precision of a bidder’s cost … estimate and the degree to which bidders know the inherent cost estimate precisions in the auction. We find that more …

, with a specific emphasis on the speed of the clock in the Dutch auction. At fast clock speeds revenue in the Dutch auction … is significantly lower than the sealed bid auction. When the clock is sufficiently slow, however, revenue in the Dutch … auction is greater than the revenue in the sealed bid auction. We develop and test a simple model of auctions with impatient …

We compare two procurement mechanisms, bundling and unbundling, in a two-stage auction model with risk-averse suppliers …. They differ in whether two sequential tasks of investment and production are procured through a single auction or two … sequential auctions. Each auction adopts a first-price format. A winner is awarded a fixed-price contract. Each supplier …