ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in firstprice auctions. …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first …-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the …

prefer the buyer-determined auction over the price-based auction, while only half of the bidders do so. A more detailed …

phenomenon of loss aversion affects the adaptive dynamics. We analyse the impact of loss aversion in a simple auction using the … and affected by loss aversion to different degrees. In any case, the experiment shows that loss aversion is not specific …

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It … fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …

We report an experiment on a decision task by SAMUELSON and BAZERMAN (1985). Subjects submit a bid for an item with an …

In eBay s Buy-it-Now auctions sellers can post prices at which buyers can purchase a good prior to an auction. We study … predictions of a model by combining the real auction environment (eBay auction platform and eBay traders) with the techniques of … lab experiments. We observe that the eBay auction format supports deviations from truthful bidding leading to auction …

overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending … price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not …

perform better than the Vickrey auction. The proportions of efficient allocations are similar in both types of auctions, but …-selecting auction. We trace the causes of the performance differences back to patterns in bids. The core-selecting auctions provide …. In the experiment, bidders react in the predicted direction to these incentives, though less pronouncedly than predicted. …