as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may …

externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our … experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …

laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English … auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly reject our theoretical prediction that the English auction leads to less … aggressive bids and fewer bankruptcies than the first-price sealed-bid auction. X-cursedness gives a robust explanation of our …

-price auction. Our experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average … bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of …

laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English … auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly reject our theoretical prediction that the English auction leads to less … aggressive bids and fewer bankruptcies than the first-price sealed-bid auction. <I>X</I>-cursedness gives a robust explanation of …

We analyze pre and post-task confidence in an experiment in which subjects bid in multi-unit common value auctions … performance. Although the change in pre-experiment confidence from session one to session two is close to zero, the dispersion in … with neutral or low confidence. Subjects with high initial confidence also base their perception of post-experiment …

describes the data. Second, we test the auction design of the electricity markets experimentally. The current auction design is … a static bidding framework. We find that if the auction were to operate under a sequential bidding auction, all market …

prevent an opponent from learning private information. This paper reports a laboratory experiment that investigates if actual … bidders account for this trade-off, using a sequential procurement auction with private cost information and varying …

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or …

. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may bias upwards the …