This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is...

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is...

We develop observable restrictions of well-known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the...

This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from the relevant social norm, but incur costs when they decide to do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest to sustain as a social norm to which everybody will want...

This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are inside the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1987) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions are...

In the present work, agreement on allocation of payments from multiple issues requires unanimous consent of all parties involved. The agents are assumed to know the aggregate payoffs but do not know their decomposition by issues. This framework applies to many real-world problems, such as the...

We consider an intertemporal game-theoretic framework in which different coalitions interact repeatedly over time. Both the terms of trade and the endogenous cooperation structure arising in this setup are characterized, in a protocol-free manner, when just three natural conditions are...

We first show through a counter-example that the existence result of Maskin: Bargaining, coalitions and externalities, Presidential address of the Econometric Society, 2003] does not extend beyond three players.Intuitively, the bargaining may not be able to continue because there may be no...

When there are three parties, instability problems brought about by the emptiness of the core of the corresponding cooperative game may cause the Coase Theorem to fail, even when other more direct impediments to bargaining are low. We show that the standard Coasean bargaining game involving...

This paper offers a historical account of the bargaining theories. It includes (i) the calculation methods for bargaining, (ii) the bargaining theories for benefit, and (iii) the bargaining theory against cost. This paper proves that economists cannot offer any satisfactory solution to these...