We provide evidence that CEO equity incentives, especially stock options, influence stock liquidity risk via … disclosure policy. Contributing to the literature on CEO risk-taking, we document a positive association between CEO options and … future systematic stock liquidity risk. Controlling for endogeneity, we show that information disclosure quality is an …

between policy uncertainty and corporate risk-taking. We show that high levels of policy uncertainty are associated with … to their own firm and by reducing firm-level risk-taking. Furthermore, our results support the hypothesis that CEO risk …

This paper studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions. A … theoretical model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive suggests that 1) in principle, excessive risk taking … (in the form of risk shifting) may be addressed by basing compensation on both stock price and the price of debt (proxied …

This study predicts and finds that chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives induced by stock option … compensation increase a bank’s contribution to systemic distress risk and systemic crash risk. We also predict and find that this … CEO incentive–systemic risk relation operates through three channels: (i) a bank’s engagement in non-interest income …

We find that managers receive more risk-taking incentives in their compensation packages once their firms are … financial distress. These findings provide suggestive evidence that boards offer pay packages that encourage greater risk taking … risk appetite …

We investigate how CEO's risk incentive (vega) affects firm innovation. To establish causality, we exploit compensation … risk-taking incentive after the implementation of FAS 123R leads to a significant reduction in innovation related to firm …'s core business and explorative inventions. It implies that managers diversify their innovation portfolios and decrease …

risk taking. One of the objectives is the motivation of further research on the topic. Risk-averse managers hold less … diversified portfolios and, thus, tend to take less risk than optimal for shareholders. More option grants may encourage risk … mitigating overall risk-taking incentives. The net effect of options on risk-taking behavior is, therefore, ambiguous and calls …

CEO incentives to mitigate the risk-shifting incentives of firm managers …