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3-Year Pay-for-Performance Analysis of the Largest 100 US Companies

Stern, Hermann J. - 2012

This paper is a summary of the findings of analyzing pay and performance for the largest 100 companies from 2009-2011 (3 years). Performance is measured by indexed Total Shareholder Return and indexed Operating Cash Flow Growth. CEO total realized pay is used as the pay metric. The research...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110296

Are CEOs in family firms paid like bureaucrats? : evidence from Bayesian and frequentist analyses

Block, Jörn (contributor) - 2008

The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executive compensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it is found that the share of base salary is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003727332

Social connections and incentives in the workplace : evidence from personnel data

Bandiera, Oriana (contributor); Barankay, Iwan (contributor) - 2008

We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace … workers managed. We find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793735

Bonus payments and reference point violations

Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2010

We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003941775

The executive turnover risk premium

Peters, Florian; Wagner, Alexander F. - 2009

We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, industry risk is, accounting for various other factors, unlikely to be associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using this identification...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003961496

The incentives for tax planning

Armstrong, Christopher; Blouin, Jennifer L.; Larcker, … - 2011 - Draft: March 8, 2011

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506609

The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO pay for luck

Paligorova, Teodora (contributor) - 2008

According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs to capture the pay-setting process and benefit from events outside of their controlget paid for luck. In this paper, I find that the independence requirement imposed on boards of directors by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003721284

Managers’ Stock-Based Compensation and Disclosures of High Proprietary Cost Information : An Investigation of US Biotech Firms

Enache, Luminita - 2020

proprietary information. While prior studies suggest that stock-based compensation provides managers with an incentive to enhance … that, on average, managers' stock-based compensation is not significantly related with their disclosure of high proprietary … cost information. More importantly, we find that a larger amount of stock-based compensation motivates managers to reveal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853081

Shareholders Have a Say in Executive Compensation : Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States

Kimbro, Marinilka Barros - 2015

This paper examines the SEC regulation requiring non-binding general shareholder vote on executive compensation–“say-on-pay” (SOP). We examine the first two years of SOP in the Russell 3000. The results confirm previous shareholder-proposal studies by finding that SOP approval (reject)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036020

The economics of restricted stock and the Section 83(b) election

Blouin, Jennifer L.; Carter, Mary Ellen - 2010 - Current Version: February 2010

As restricted stock is increasingly important in compensation packages, understanding its unique institutional features becomes paramount. We study the interplay between tax and incentive attributes to show how management appears to be utilizing a unique tax election to generate firm benefits....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009349801