Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is the approach of managing all risks faced by a firm in an integrated, holistic fashion. This research analyzes factors that influence a firm's decision to start an ERM program. We argue that top management's decision to adopt ERM is influenced by managerial...

Using the most recent data available, I examine the influence of large shareholders and institutional investors on different components of CEO compensation. Increased large shareholder ownership reduces total pay and current elements of incentive compensation, i.e. option, stock, and bonus pay,...

Exploiting the setting of staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (hereafter IDD) in U.S. state courts, we examine how quasi-exogenous restrictions of outside employment opportunities affect CEOs' risk preferences. IDD adoption constrains executives' ability to work for...

Active corporate executives are a popular source of independent directors. Although their knowledge, expertise, and network can bring value to firms on whose boards they sit, independent executive directors may be more likely to be distracted than other directors due to their outside executive...

Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...

CEO emotions are difficult to measure and hence empirically understudied. However, using artificial emotional intelligence, positive and negative affects can be identified from facial muscle contraction-relaxation patterns obtained from public CEO photos during initial coin offerings (ICOs),...

We study the emergence of blockholders as an important mechanism that corrects deviations from target CEO relative debt-to-equity incentive ratios. We find that a new active blockholder more likely emerges when a firm deviates from target; deviations fall during the period the blockholder owns...

Previous studies argue that takeover targets’ CEOs can use high leverage as a signal for commitment to undertaking value-enhancing projects, thus deterring the takeover attempts since the bankruptcy risk associated with high leverage can serve as an effective governance mechanism. This paper...