This Article identifies a cost to public investors of tying executive pay to the future value of a firm's stock - even its long-term value. In particular, such an arrangement can incentivize executives to engage in share repurchases (when the current stock price is low) and equity issuances...

This Article identifies a cost to public investors of tying executive pay to the future value of a firm's stock - even its long-term value. In particular, such an arrangement can incentivize executives to engage in share repurchases (when the current stock price is low) and equity issuances...

We analyze the effects of CEOs' layoff risk on their risk choice while overseeing a firm. A CEO, whose managerial ability is unknown, is fired if her expected ability is below average. Her risk choice changes the informativeness of output and market's belief about her ability. She can decrease...

The paper investigates the role of CEO's equity and risk incentives in boosting securitization in the financial industry and in motivating executives to reduce the perceived risk while betting on it. Using a sample of US financial institutions over the period 2003-2009 we document that CEOs with...

This paper proposes a new approach to study how corporate policies change upon the replacement of the CEO. We employ empirical Bayes simultaneous tests on the executive fixed effects and find a significant heterogeneity in their styles. Furthermore, we implement a measure that explores the...

The paper outlines the developments in the EU regulatory framework for executive remuneration since 2004 and going through the financial crisis. It also presents the results of an analysis of the remuneration practices adopted by the largest European listed firms before and after the crisis,...

This study examines determinants of chairman compensation in a supervisory board setting and, specifically, the relationship between chairman and CEO compensation. Using a sample of publicly listed firms in Sweden, the study indicates that chairman compensation – despite its fixed nature –...

This paper examines the implications of CEO overconfidence for firm distress risk and investment-related activities in the unique context of adverse incidents. I use an options‐based proxy for CEO overconfidence and study two types of adverse incidents: negative news reports and hurricanes....