We study the role of foreign directors in U.S. firms. We conclude that foreign directors, especially those from countries that are dissimilar to the U.S. in terms of business environment (i.e., dissimilar directors), are chosen by multinational corporations (MNCs) to provide advice, and this...

Executive compensation is designed to create incentives for CEOs to act in the best interest of shareholders. Short-term (bonus) and equity-based incentives induce risk taking behaviors of the CEO that could further change a firm's risk exposure. This article examines the linkage between...

This paper examines how the tournament-like progression in the CEO labor market influences corporate innovation strategies. By exploiting a text-based proxy for product innovation based on product descriptions from 10-Ks, we find a significant positive relation between industry tournament...

By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into...

The objective of this paper is to define the relationship between a set of factors and CEO compensation that will enable companies to imply better corporate governance practices in their management process. Developed econometric model is tested on the data of US telecom companies for the period...

This paper examines the issue of board diversity and the role of women in the finance industry. Estimation of panel data regressions for a sample of all financial institutions in Canada and the US over the period 2008-2019 identified some qualitative and quantitative factors that allowed the...

We examine how the trade shock from China influences the behavior and investment performance of overconfident CEOs in U.S. firms. We show that the rise of Chinese import competition curbs investments and improves investment value and acquisition performance for firms with overconfident CEOs....

This study examines the relation of independent directors and their gender diversity, busyness, and experience with risk taking for 112 listed US insurance companies over 2003-2010. Using OLS, system GMM and 3SLS, we find that board independence, females amongst independent directors and busy...

Between 2007 and 2016, 7.6% of publicly listed U.S. firms disclosed that their CEOs had pledged company stock as collateral for a loan. On average, CEOs pledge 38% of their shares. The mean loan value is an economically sizeable $65 million. CEOs use the funds to either double down (6.0%), hedge...

Critics of U.S. executive pay practices have raised four major concerns: (1) executive pay is too high; (2) CEO contracts do not provide strong enough incentives to increase value (i.e., there is too little pay-for-performance); (3) options and other equity-based pay provide windfalls, large...