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A Structural Estimation of the Cost of Suboptimal Matching in the CEO Labor Market
Nickerson, Jordan - 2013
unobservable cost associated with the inability of firms and managers to be optimally matched in the cross-section …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072798
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CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework
Eisfeldt, Andrea L. - 2014
firms form matches based on multiple characteristics. The model also has new predictions about replacement managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013069958
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An activist view of CEO compensation
Baum, Alex; Hale, Robert; Morfit, Mason; Larcker, David F. - 2017
Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
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CEO Incentives and Earnings Prediction
Gong, James Jianxin - 2012
This study investigates whether information about Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives is useful for predicting future earnings. We find that in companies with higher CEO equity incentives, current year earnings are more informative of future earnings than in other companies. Additionally,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107405
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Belief Precision and Effort Incentives in Promotion Contests
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2012
The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmström, 1982/1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision if promotions to better-paid jobs make the returns to reputation non-linear. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183448
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Lame-Duck CEOs
Gabarro, Marc - 2018
We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917130
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Promotion Incentives, CEO Appointments and Firm Performance
Strydom, Maria - 2012
Executive remuneration is often criticised as being excessive and not clearly linked to firm performance. This study further examines the link between pay and performance by examining the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives. Our hypotheses draw on tournament theory of labour...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013101493
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The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts
Lund, Andrew - 2014
For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058
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Does Firing a CEO Pay Off?
Alexandridis, George - 2019
We examine whether involuntary CEO replacements pay off by improving firm prospects. We find CEO successors' acquisition investments to be associated with significantly higher shareholder gains relative to their predecessors and the average CEO. This improvement in post-turnover acquisition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899356
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Short Termism of Executive Compensation
Pogach, Jonathan - 2011
managers who implement them. Consequently, long term contracts must align incentives across multiple managers, which comes at … observe the returns of accepted projects. Managers choose short term projects and earn all information rents and avoid long … term projects, in which these rents accrue to future managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118905