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Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams : the role of social ties
De Paola, Maria; Gioia, Francesca; Scoppa, Vincenzo - 2016
basis of individual performance and the other graded on the basis of the team performance. We find that students assigned to … socially connected teams perform significantly better than control students in both the team part and the individual part of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011543736
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Free-Riding and Knowledge Spillovers in Teams: The Role of Social Ties
De Paola, Maria; Gioia, Francesca; Scoppa, Vincenzo - 2016
basis of individual performance and the other graded on the basis of the team performance. We find that students assigned to … socially connected teams perform significantly better than control students in both the team part and the individual part of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011559685
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Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams : the role of social ties
De Paola, Maria; Gioia, Francesca; Scoppa, Vincenzo - In: European economic review : EER 112 (2019), pp. 74-90
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237750
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Monopolistic group design with peer effects
Board, Simon - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 89-125
In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699153
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Cooperation or Collusion? Rents in Relational Contracts for Teams
Ishihara, Akifumi - 2019
observed individual signals should be aggregated to a commonly observed team signal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863568
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A Repeated Principal-Agent Model with On-the-Job Search
Herbold, Daniel - 2016
This paper analyzes how on-the-job search (OJS) by an agent impacts the moral hazard problem in a repeated principal-agent relationship. OJS is found to constitute a source of agency costs because efficient search incentives require that the agent receives all gains from trade. Further, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006067
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Expert Advice and Optimal Project Termination
Madsen, Erik - 2018
I analyze how a firm should elicit advice from an expert on when to terminate a project with a stochastic lifespan. The firm cannot directly observe the project's lifespan, but imperfectly monitors its current state by observing incremental output. The expert directly observes the state of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922810
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A Repeated Principal-Agent Model with On-the-Job Search
Herbold, Daniel - 2014
This paper analyzes how on-the-job search (OJS) by an agent impacts the moral hazard problem in a repeated principal-agent relationship. OJS is found to constitute a source of agency costs because efficient search incentives require that the agent receives all gains from trade. Further, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060799
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Friends and foes at work : assigning teams in a social network
Daske, Thomas - 2017
In many firms, production requires the division of staff into teams. If only team performance is observable, moral … among team members. I investigate how the division of staff into teams should account for the agents' social network of … interpersonal relationships. Considering piece rate compensation for teams, I identify rules for efficient team assignment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773831
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Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations
Deb, Joyee - 2015
both exert effort and report on his co-worker's performance (as in a team setting), the worker's effort incentives cannot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025571