Can a government credibly promise not to bailout firms whose failure would have major negative systemic consequences? Our analysis of Korea's 1997-98 crisis, suggests an answer: No. Despite a general “no bailout” policy during the crisis, the largest Korean corporate groups – facing severe...

This paper examines the two-way relationship between managerial compensation and corporate risk by exploiting an unanticipated change in firms' business risks. The natural experiment provides an opportunity to examine two classic questions related to incentives and risk — how boards adjust...

Exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges, we document that judges appointed by a Democrat president impose larger fines for corporate crimes involving environmental and labor regulations while Republican-appointed judges impose larger fines for crimes involving the hiring of illegal...

We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are attentive to whether a manager's actions benefit the...

We derive a measure that captures the extent to which common ownership shifts managers' incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are attentive to whether a manager's actions benefit the investor's overall...

This article examines managers' incentive to play it safe. We find that, after managers are insulated by the adoption of an antitakeover law, they take value-destroying actions that reduce their firms' stock volatility and risk of distress. To illustrate one such action, we show that managers...

Pursuing delinquent borrowers requires considerable effort, and creditors may lack the incentive to exert this costly effort in uncompetitive banking sectors. To examine this, we use a uniquely large dataset of public and private corporate bankruptcy filings spanning a banking-sector reform that...

Fund trades and prices vary systematically with the quarterly reporting cycle. Funds are more likely to complete the building of a position at quarter-end, which is when most funds report positions to investors, and begin building new positions afterwards. While some of the observed shift in...

Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (or “common errors”), such as industry-specific shocks, is a fundamental challenge in empirical research. This paper discusses the limitations of two approaches widely used in corporate finance and asset pricing research: demeaning the dependent...

In this paper, we use a simple model to illustrate that the existence of a large, negative wealth shock and insufficient insurance against such a shock can potentially explain both the limited stock market participation puzzle and the low-consumption-high-savings puzzle that are widely...