This paper develops a principal-agent model to explore the interaction of corruption, bribery, and political oversight of production. Under full information, an honest politician achieves the first best while a dishonest politician creates shortages and bribes. Under asymmetric information, an...

We develop a general theory of intertemporal choice: the reference-time theory, RT. RT is a synthesis of ideas from the generalized hyperbolic model (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992), the quasi-hyperbolic model (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997) and subadditivity of time discounting (Roelofsma...

Evidence shows that (i) people overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities, but (ii) ignore events of extremely low probability and treat extremely high probability events as certain. Decision models, such as rank dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative prospect theory (CP),...