We describe a mechanism for government taking under uncertainty that provides incentives for governments to make efficient taking decisions and for property owners to use their properties efficiently. We argue that efficiency in takings requires that governments not only pay the value of...

The efficiency of mechanisms to control activities with negative externalities is limited by uncertainty about the social costs of these activities. Existing regulatory mechanisms require negotiated compromise about either the prices of activities or the levels to be tolerated. We offer a...

Existing mechanisms for managing eminent domain suggest that, when there is uncertainty about whether a government will take property, efficiency requires that the property owner receive at most partial compensation. We argue that announcing the possibility of a taking is itself a taking when...

The evaluation of policy-relevant economic research requires an ethical foundation.Classical liberal theory provides the requisite foundation for this dissertation, which usesvarious econometric tools to estimate the effects of shifting some of the property tax frombuildings to land in 15 cities...