I consider a repeated trust game played between a group of insiders, arranged in a network representing their lines of communication, and a single outsider. Insiders follow a local punishment rule, shunning the outsider if it has cheated them or a neighbor. The object of interest is that the...

I study endogenous network formation in an environment in which individuals want to forecast a stochastic state and it is costly for them to communicate with others to exchange some exogenously observed information. Due to the existence of information complementarities, individuals' preferences...

I consider a repeated trust game played between a group of insiders, arranged in a network representing their lines of communication, and a single outsider. Insiders follow a local punishment rule, shunning the outsider if it has cheated them or a neighbor. The object of interest is that the...

Widely used information diffusion models such as Independent Cascade Model, Susceptible Infected Recovered (SIR) and others fail to acknowledge that information is constantly subject to modification. Some aspects of information diffusion are best explained by network structural characteristics...

This paper exploits a novel hand-collected dataset to provide a comprehensive analysis of the social relationships that underlie illegal insider trading networks. I find that inside information flows through strong social ties based on family, friends, and geographic proximity. On average,...

Consider a group of individuals with unobservable perspectives (subjective prior beliefs) about a sequence of states. In each period, each individual receives private information about the current state and forms an opinion (a posterior belief). She also chooses a target individual and observes...

This paper studies the diffusion of products and behaviour with coordination effects through social networks when agents are myopic best responders. We develop a new network measure, the contagion threshold, that determines when a p-dominant action – an action that is a best response when...

Processes of polarization have been documented in several applications. Yet most existing theories focus on how herding behavior and convergence of opinions tend to occur in different contexts. In this paper we develop a model where agents correct their heterogeneous initial opinion by averaging...

This paper studies the long-run (stochastic) stability of an evolutionary model with persistent randomness in network games. We focus on evolutionary dynamics in symmetric coordination games where players choose the best responses to their opponents' strategies. Recent studies find that the...

I study social learning in networks with information acquisition and choice. Bayesian agents act in sequence, observe the choices of their connections, and acquire information via sequential search. Complete learning occurs if search costs are not bounded away from zero and the network is...