Similar Search Results

Outside director-shareholder agency conflicts : evidence from bank consolidation

Tompkins, Jim; Hendershott, Robert - In: Corporate governance : the international journal for … 12 (2012) 3, pp. 378-391

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571059

CEO's age and acquisition behaviors of REITs

Zhang, Fan; Ooi, Joseph T. L. - In: Real estate economics 50 (2022) 4, pp. 1107-1140

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013275953

The young and the restless : a study of age and acquisition propensity of CEOs and UK firms

Zhang, Teng; Sabherwal, Sanjiv; Jayarman, Narayanan; … - In: Journal of business finance & accounting : JBFA 43 (2016) 9/10, pp. 1385-1419

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011644033

When target CEOs contract with acquirers : evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions

Brewer, Elijah (contributor); … - 2006

This paper investigates the impact of the target chief executive officer’s (CEO) postmerger position on the purchase premium and target shareholders’ abnormal returns around the announcement of the deal in a sample of bank mergers during the period 1990–2004. We find evidence that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730559

The executive turnover risk premium

Peters, Florian; Wagner, Alexander F. - 2009

We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, industry risk is, accounting for various other factors, unlikely to be associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using this identification...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003961496

CEO preferences and acquisitions

Jenter, Dirk; Lewellen, Katharina - 2011 - This draft: December 2011

receiving a successful takeover bid is sharply higher when target CEOs are close to age 65. Takeover premiums and target …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009504779

Management takeover battles and the role of the "golden handshake"

Fabel, Oliver; Kolmar, Martin - 2002

The effect of severance pay on management behavior during a takeover battle is generally ambiguous. Yet, the severance … still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's total value. Moreover, given that the managers are compensated … according to an identical linear incentive scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009491061

Does CEO fitness matter?

Limbach, Peter; Sonnenburg, Florian - 2015 - This draft: November 2015

This study provides evidence suggesting that CEOs’ physical fitness has a positive impact on firm value, consistent with the beneficial effects of fitness on, e.g., cognitive functions, stress coping and job performance. For each of the years 2001 to 2011, we define S&P 1500 CEOs as fit if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392655

CEO fitness and firm value

Limbach, Peter; Sonnenburg, Florian - 2015 - First Draft: September 2014, This Draft: May 2015

We provide evidence for a positive impact of CEO fitness on firm value (Tobin's Q). For each of the years 2001 to 2011, we define S&P 1500 CEOs as fit if they finish a marathon. Fit CEOs are associated with higher firm profitability and M&A announcement returns. Effects on firm value are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010517150

Merger performance and managerial incentives

Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2014

We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291