The global financial crisis has exposed the many limits of disclosure as an effective regulatory tool in financial markets. First, the famed disciplining power of the market failed to constrain disastrous risk taking by banks. Second, most of the risks that led to the creation of the 2008...

This paper analyzes the causal relationship between institutional diversity in domestic banking sectors and bank stability. We use a large bank- and country-level unbalanced panel data set covering the EU member states' banking sectors between 1998 and 2014. Constructing two distinct indicators...

The coronavirus pandemic is creating overwhelming needs, in three waves. First is the health crisis; second is the macroeconomic crisis created by the abrupt halt in much business activity; and now third is a consumer crisis, as households are faced with total or partial job loss, sharp income...

Promises by media platforms to provide digital transaction services will likely lead to a flood of new money. While these developments are potentially valuable, under current law the money created is unsound. It is not insured by the government, nor is it backed by safe assets. We should not...

This paper illustrates channels by which regulations that require banks to hold liquid assets can either increase or decrease a bank's incentive to take risk with its remaining ineligible assets. A greater capacity to respond to liquidity stress increases the potential profits a bank would put...

Textual analysis of 14,270 NBER Working Papers published during 1999–2016 is done to assess the effects of the 2008 crisis on the economics literature. The volume of crisis-related WPs is counter-cyclical, lagging the financial-instability-index. WPs by the Monetary-Economics, Asset-Pricing,...

Contrary to public perception and previous literature on public bailout subsidies, we find over the recent 43-year period equityholders in big banks paid fairly for TBTF bailout insurance in terms of equity returns. In normal (non-crisis) periods, after TBTF in 1984, big banks pay an...

We identify and track over time the factors that make the financial system vulnerable to fire sales by constructing an index of aggregate vulnerability. The index starts increasing quickly in 2004, before most other major systemic risk measures, and triples by 2008. The fire-sale-specific...

We build an equilibrium model of the capital structure and risk-taking in the originate-to-distribute intermediation chain in presence of absolute demand for safety by some investors and limited endowment by equity investors. Loan originators may expand investment by raising funds from...