We provide evidence that outside directors’ trading and ratification decisions are incrementally useful in assessing their independence. Because crises test the independence of boards, we first investigate the CEO replacement decision in firms caught intentionally misreporting earnings. We...

We examine the economics of independent directors’ resignation decisions by taking advantage of a natural setting: The revised Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, which took effect on March 1, 2020 (hereafter New Securities Law or NSL), and the first successful class-action...

I explore whether directors who resign in dissent from their board are rewarded in the labor market for directors. Using a hand collected sample of 278 boardroom disputes reported in 8-K filings during 1995-2006, I show that firms which have disputes are small, highly levered, have poor...

Using a sample of all top management who were indicted for illegal insider trading in the United States for trades during the period 1989-2002, we explore the economic rationality of this white-collar crime. If this crime is an economically rational activity in the sense of Becker (1968), where...

For the first time, a framework is introduced that allows for a real options analysis to be performed in an EVA/MVA-embedded binomial tree. This framework enhances traditional EVA/MVA analysis so that it can capture the additional value generated through strategic decision making during a...

Using a sample of all top management who were indicted for illegal insider trading in the United States for trades during the period 1989-2002, we explore the economic rationality of this white-collar crime. If this crime is an economically rational activity in the sense of Becker (1968), where...