I study the board structure of a sample of dual-class firms from 1996 to 2002, and relate it to the degree of control-cash flow rights divergence. Compared to a group of matched single-class firms with similar contracting environment when ownership structure was made, dual-class firms have...

We find a significant hump-shaped relation between firm valuation and CEO ownership when external governance (EG) is weak, but the relation is insignificant when EG is strong. These interactive effects are identified while controlling for firm-fixed effects. The results imply that CEO ownership...

This paper analyses the German corporate law reform's effect on the publicly listed companies' ownership and performance. First, theoretically plausible implications of the most important laws that were issued 1990-2009 are provided, then an empirical analysis using 1997-2008 panel data...

This article examines the impact of the divergence between corporate insiders' control rights and cash-flow rights on firms' external finance constraints via generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation. Using a large sample of U.S. firms during the 1994–2002...

From 1988 to 2007, over 1,100 publicly traded firms used the dual class structure. Despite the structure's effectiveness at maintaining control, approximately one fourth of these firms eliminated the dual class structure. In 95 firms, superior shareholders voluntarily eliminated the dual class...

We analyze the long-term effects of divesture and ownership change on corporate performance. We employ a unique data set for a large number of Czech firms spanning the period 1996-2005. We employ a propensity score matching procedure to deal with endogeneity problems. Our results, which are...

I show that private equity transactions (i) illustrate market-driven reactions to inefficient equity markets that result from the diffusion of equity ownership in the public firm and (ii) form part of a larger market trend to-wards the market oriented blockholder model – a hybrid ownership...

We study the role of pyramidal ownership structures in the creation of new firms. Our results suggest that pyramids arise because they provide a financing advantage in setting up new firms when the pledgeability of cash flows to outside financiers is limited. Parent companies supply inside funds...

We study the relation between state ownership and cash holdings in China's share-issue privatized firms from 1993 to 2007. We find that the level of cash holdings declines as state ownership increases. This negative relation is attributable to the soft-budget constraint (SBC) inherent in state...

Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for...