The entire architecture of contemporary corporate governance is reminiscent of a house of cards. This particular metaphor invokes two ideas that are important for understanding the current state of the debate surrounding corporate governance. Firstly, it captures the fragile facade of corporate...

Minority shareholdings have been on the regulatory agenda of competition authorities for some time. Recent empirical studies, however, draw attention to a new, thought provoking theory of harm: common ownership by institutional investors holding small, parallel equity positions in several...

Companies worldwide increasingly engaged in corporate social responsibility disclosure, particularly corporate environmental disclosure (CED) has gained increasing importance since the 1980s. Reporting environmental performance has become a fundamental corporate governance mechanism to improve...

Over recent years, a number of regulators have launched proposals to expand the obligation to disclose major share ownership in listed companies. This paper shows that these are not stand-alone developments. Using a unique dataset comprising data from 25 countries over 11 years (1995-2005) and...

Egypt witnessed radical and unexpected changes in political, social and cultural environment that came as a result of the Arab Spring. Since the revolution caused a paradigm shift in so many socio-economic aspects; it is plausible that it also caused dramatic changes in different ways in the...

Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure and reporting regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly listed companies. Today, a common post-financial crisis regulatory reform theme...

Theories of delegated monitoring predict that when public disclosure is costly, monitoring by a large investor leads management to supply more private information to that investor, and less public disclosure to other similarly aligned investors who free-ride off the monitor. We test this...

Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (“common ownership”). Taking market share from peers no longer maximizes shareholder value under common ownership, which incentivizes managers to implement less competitive strategies (Azar, 2016)....

Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (“common ownership”), and this ownership structure is positively associated with voluntary disclosure. We posit that common owners want managers to take coordinated anti-competitive actions (i.e.,...