We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers' posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper sheds...

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers’ posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper...

This is a survey on the recent game theoretic literature on committee decision making. We consider theoretical work on the role of (i) strategic voting, (ii) costly information acquisition, (iii) conflicting interests, and (iv) communication in committees. Moreover, we review recent experimental...

We consider the election model in which voters choose a subset from the set of candidates. Both voters and candidates are assumed to possess preferences with separable strict orderings. We investigate a rule satisfying candidate stability, which is the requirement to deter any candidate from...

This paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international environmental agreement (IEA) apply different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the...

Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a "productive state". At heart of...

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...

This paper proves stronger versions of the Gibbard random dictatorship theorem using induction on the number of voters. It shows that when there are at least three voters, every random social choice function defined on a domain satisfying a Free Triple at the Top property and satisfying a weak...

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are...