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Kuang, Zhonghong; Lien, Jaimie W.; Zheng, Jie - 2023

We study a hierarchical Bayesian persuasion game with a sender, a receiver, and several potential intermediaries, generalizing the framework of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). The sender must be persuasive through a hierarchy of intermediaries to reach the final receiver, whose action affects all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014344060

Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict

Spector, David M. - 2003

This paper studies repeated communication regarding a multidimensional collective decision in a large population. When … assumptions, that public communication causes the disagreement between beliefs either to vanish or to become one-dimensional at … the limit. Multidimensional disagreement allows indeed for many directions of communication, including some which are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151480

Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals

Chand, A.K.S; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2016

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153232

Leadership by Example and by Pre-Game Communication in Social Dilemma Situations

Pogrebna, Ganna; Krantz, David; Schade, Christian; … - 2009

This paper compares the effects of two leadership styles: leading by pre-game communication and leading by example … using an iterated voluntary contribution game. We find that pre-game communication increases the level of individual …-game communication. We also find that the content of pre-game communication has a higher impact on individual decisions than the ex post …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215365

Delegating learning

Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421

A Must Lie Situation : Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback

Gneezy, Uri; Gravert, Christina Annette; Saccardo, Silvia; … - 2016

We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034915

Perturbed Communication Games with Honest Senders and Naive Receivers

Chen, Ying - 2009

This paper studies communication games in which the sender is possibly honest (who tells the truth) and the receiver is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059644

Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games

Chen, Ying; Gordon, Sidartha - 2013

centralization and delegation, and (iii) two-way communication with an informed principal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158276

Directional Cheap Talk in Electoral Campaigns

Schnakenberg, Keith E. - 2015

, I develop and analyze a game-theoretic model of campaign communication in a two-candidate majority rule election with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147381

Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases

Karakoç, Gülen - 2020

A decision-maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision-maker, which is their private information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093182