Showing 41 - 50 of 210,246
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747574
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of … ; Signaling game ; Communication game ; Dynamic stability ; Voronoi tesselation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921430
In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are …-uniformly distributed types. -- Cheap Talk ; Signaling Game ; Communication Game ; Voronoi tesselation ; Conflict of Interest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009388067
model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before … are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's Stag Hunt game we find that communication is useless if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432
informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326
We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated … and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is … robust to preplay communication between the bidders. If there are three or more symmetric bidders, or two symmetric bidders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009745257
We report results from a sender-receiver deception game, which tests whether an individual's decision to deceive is influenced by a concern for relative standing in a reference group. The sender ranks six possible outcomes, each specifying a payoff for him and the receiver. A message is then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404042
The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810295
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113