Similar Search Results

The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts

Lund, Andrew - 2014

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058

The Economic (In) Significance of Executive Pay ESG Incentives

Walker, David I. - 2022

The hottest topic in corporate governance circles today involves company commitments to and pursuit of ESG (environmental, social, and governance) initiatives in addition to the traditional pursuit of profits. One facet of this debate has to do with how to motivate executives to pursue ESG...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013305552

Trading away incentives

Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, Giuliano Antonio; Xia, Shuo - 2022 - This draft: October 19, 2022

, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of … motives in managers' portfolio choices. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411812

Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

Gayle, George-Levi; Li, Chen; Miller, Robert - 2022

goal of expected value maximization; (2) increased the cost of agency, or the risk premium CEOs are paid to align their … no effect on the attitude of CEOs toward risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244206

Incentives to Cheat : The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation

Harris, Jared D.; Bromiley, Philip - 2008

Despite the many undesirable outcomes of corporate misconduct, scholars have an inadequate understanding of corporate misconduct's causes and mechanisms. We extend the behavioral theory of the firm, which traditionally assumes away the possibility of firm impropriety, to develop hypotheses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224631

Incentive Realignment : Mutual Funds’ Influence on Executive Compensation Contracts

Agarwal, Vikas; Cao, Sean; Huang, Shawn X.; Kim, Min - 2021

corroborate these findings to reveal more pronounced effects when fund managers have stronger career incentives and are less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236397

Entrenchment or Incentive? CEO Employment Contracts and Acquisition Decisions

Zhao, Jing - 2013

A long-standing controversy is whether CEO employment contracts insulate inferior managers from discipline leading to … shareholder wealth destruction, or whether contracts alleviate managerial risk aversion and encourage value-enhancing decisions … definitions of just cause (good reason) for CEO termination (resignation) alleviate managerial risk aversion, reduce contracting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083291

Agency Problem II and Convergence in CEO Pay

Haman, Janto - 2012

Convergence in CEO pay occurs when pay differentials narrow over time. We analyze and compare differences in the rate of convergence in CEO pay of Australian listed firms with high shareholding concentration (HSC) and without, for the period 1992 to 2009. We find zero and negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097908

Incentive Pay and Managerial Expertise : Get More for Less?

Lukas, Christian - 2005

In this paper the impact of ability and learning potential on incentive contracts is analyzed. The model's pay structure shows if agents must be motivated both to acquire knowledge and to use it appropriately the most successful agent need not be the one who receives the highest pay ex post. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014087551

Managerial Expertise, Learning Potential, and Incentive Pay : Get More for Less?

Lukas, Christian - 2007

In this paper the impact of ability and learning potential on incentive contracts is analyzed. A central feature of the model is that the true ability will not be revealed. The learning potential of an agent is modeled as the magnitude of impact on the agent's expected ability that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222549