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Incentives and the structure of communication

Rivera, Thomas J. - 2016

restricted to a particular network (e.g., a hierarchy). When communication between the mediator and the players is not direct and … private, as assumed when invoking the revelation principle, there may be incentives for other players in the network to … network of communication such that restricting communication between the mediator and the players to a particular network does …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561150

Smooth, strategic communication : conference paper

Deimen, Inga; Szalay, Dezsö - 2014

We study strategic communication between a Sender and Receiver who are both uncertain about their preferred actions. The Sender observes noisy signals about both players' ideal policies and then communicates with the Receiver. Even though Sender and Receiver disagree about ideal policies as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482440

Power and the privilege of clarity : an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386160

Crime and Education in a Model of Information Transmission

Cortes, Darwin F. - 2010

We model the decisions of young individuals to stay in school or drop-out and engage in criminal activities. We build on the literature on human capital and crime engagement and use the framework of Banerjee (1993) that assumes that the information needed to engage in crime arrives in the form...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135999

Expertise, Structure, and Reputation of Corporate Boards

Levit, Doron - 2012

This paper studies the optimal structure of the board with an emphasis on the expertise of directors. The analysis provides three main results. First, the expertise of a value-maximizing board can harm shareholder value. Second, it is optimal to design a board whose members are biased against...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013114586

The Effect of a Firm’s Information Flow Structure on Credit Rationing

Soni, Advait - 2011

This paper analyzes the effects of the way information is produced and transmitted through an organizational structure on the business dynamics of a firm. Specifically, I study its effects on the agency problem, concluding that it proves to be an efficient and effective solution to overcome the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122729

Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

Golosov, Mikhail - 2011

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124963

Information (in) Chains : Information Transmission Through Production Chains

Areosa, Waldyr - 2012

How does the sensitivity of prices to public information changes along a production chain? We examine this question in a setting where prices in a stage affect the cost of next stage firms and also contain information about the unobserved state of the economy. Our results depend on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013102333

Information Percolation Driving Volatility

Andrei, Daniel - 2012

Sudden big price changes are followed by periods of high and persistent volatility. I develop a tractable dynamic rational expectations model consistent with this observation. An infinity of agents possess dispersed information about future dividends and trade in centralized markets. Information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109066

Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures : Theory and Evidence

Dreher, Axel - 2013

This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of government in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075612