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How large are two-sided transaction costs in online platform trades, and who are the major beneficiaries of friction cost reductions? Using a dataset of a multi-use train ticket resale market, we analyze the welfare structure with buyer-seller matching frictions on an online platform. Our model...
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A new style of durable goods consumption through a large scale online redistribution marketplace (e.g. eBay and Yahoo! Auction), characterized by a relatively small degree of usage and a short-term ownership, is becoming increasingly popular these days. Yet, the market and welfare structures of...
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This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers---the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank---to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868424
We investigate the causal effect of local crime on betting shop openings. Crime in an area can generate demand for gambling services as criminals and gamblers may share similar preferences: risk loving and instant gratification. To isolate the effect, we develop an empirical model to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968959
This online appendix contains the plots and supplemental descriptions for "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses."The paper "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses" to which this Supplement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973476
Structural asymmetric first-price auction estimation methods have provided numerous empirical studies. However, due to the unobserved nature of underlying valuations, the accuracy of estimates is not feasibly testable with field data, a fact that could inhibit empirical auction market designs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973510