Observational learning is typically examined when agents have precise information about their position in the sequence of play. We present a model in which agents are uncertain about their positions. Agents sample the decisions of past individuals and receive a private signal about the state of...

I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning, an agent's payoff depends both on the state and...

Observational learning is typically examined when agents have precise information about their position in the sequence of play. We present a model in which agents are uncertain about their positions. Agents are allowed to have arbitrary ex-ante beliefs about their positions: they may observe...

This article provides a national perspective on hospital performance for 30-day risk-standardized mortality rates and risk-standardized readmission rates for patients hospitalized with acute myocardial infarction and heart failure.

This article provides a national perspective on hospital performance for 30-day risk-standardized mortality rates and risk-standardized readmission rates for patients hospitalized with acute myocardial infarction and heart failure.

This paper presents a model in which homogeneous rational agents choose between two competing technologies. Agents observe a private signal and a sample of other agents’ previous choices. The signal has both an idiosyncratic and an aggregate component of uncertainty. I derive the optimal...

We propose a novel methodology to uncover the sorting pattern in the labor market. Our methodology exploits the additional information contained in profits, which complements the information from wages and transitions typically used in previous work. We identify the strength of sorting solely...