This paper investigates the economic consequences of firms connected to organized crime (criminal firms) and shows that when a criminal firm is eliminated from an industry, the performance of non-criminal competitors significantly increases. We also show that the positive effect on the...

In this paper, we develop and test the hypothesis that tax repatriation costs increase the uncertainty embedded in cash holdings. The intuition behind our empirical prediction relies on the notion that tax repatriation costs are a strong indication that part of the cash is not available to...

The paper investigates the role of CEO risk incentives in increasing the riskiness of securitization transactions in the financial industry. Using a sample of US financial institutions, and a system model to account for the endogeneity problem between risk incentives and securitization, we...

This paper investigates whether the fair value accounting for available-for-sale (AfS) securities and the capital regulation permit to shift risk from shareholders to creditors. Using a sample of 5,510 firm-year observations generated from 754 unique U.S. banks from 1998 to 2013, we find that...

We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud triggers reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks'...

The paper investigates the role of CEO's equity and risk incentives in boosting securitization in the financial industry and in motivating executives to reduce the perceived risk while betting on it. Using a sample of US financial institutions over the period 2003-2009 we document that CEOs with...