We analyze a model in which information may be voluntarily disclosed by a firm and/or by a third party, e.g., financial analysts. Due to its strategic nature, corporate voluntary disclosure is qualitatively different from third-party disclosure. Greater analyst coverage crowds out (crowds in)...

New technologies such as product simulators and virtual reality now allow firms to provide realistic product usage experiences and reduce buyer uncertainty about product quality. We argue that today's firms should view product design and investments to reduce buyer uncertainty as an integrated...

A sender chooses ex ante how her information will be disclosed to a privately informed receiver who then takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender faces an ex ante quantity-quality tradeoff: sending positive...

Economists, regulators, and consumer protection agencies have highlighted the welfare losses for consumers who purchase high-load insurance against modest stakes risks. Mandatory information disclosure is a potentially attractive public policy tool that might improve consumers' choices, but has...

This study tests whether disclosing a trader's identity dampens or stimulates subsequent trading volume based on the trader's reputation for being informed. While a reputation for being informed makes markets less liquid, thus inhibiting subsequent trade ("illiquidity effect"), the information...

The purpose of this paper is to examine determinants of financial information disclosure by Tunisian companies. The methodology is based on qualitative approach, using the cognitive mapping technique. To take into account the specificities of the Tunisian economic, we felt that it is essential...

Financial executives of firms engaged in forward contracting have raised concerns that mandated disclosure of those contracts would reveal proprietary information to rival firms. This paper considers the basis for those concerns in the framework of a duopoly in which one privately informed...

Sophisticated financial market participants frequently choose to disclose private information to the public—a phenomenon inconsistent with most theories of speculative trading. In this paper, we propose and test a model to bridge this gap. We show that when a speculator cares about both the...

We examine firms’ voluntary R&D disclosure under technology coopetition, focusing on technology standard setting organizations (SSOs). Technology coopetition is characterized by i) cooperation to determine technology standards, which requires information sharing to reach consensus, and ii)...