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Learning to compete and coordinate in a complex world

Marsili, M.; Mulet, R.; Ricci-Tersenghi, F. - In: Heterogenous agents, interactions and economic performance, (pp. 61-74). 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001749777

Monotone games with positive spillovers

Gale, Douglas - In: Games and economic behavior 37 (2001) 2, pp. 295-320

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001651768

If Nobody is Going There Anymore Because it's Too Crowded, Then Who is Going? Experimental Evidence of Learning And Imitation in the El Farol Coordination Game

Leady, James R. - 2008

paper evaluates coordination among agents in these environments. In particular, this paper discusses how people implicitly … learn to coordinate their actions when such coordination is beneficial, but difficult. It uses the experimental method … repeatedly update their strategies during play of a coordination game known as the El Farol Bar Game. In this experiment a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014214308

Cognitive ability, character skills, and learning to play equilibrium : a level-k analysis

Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria L. - 2014

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability and character skills influence behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364492

Sustaining cooperation : community enforcement vs. specialized enforcement

Acemoglu, Daron; Wolitzky, Alexander - 2015

We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement. Specialized enforcers need to be given incentives to carry out costly punishments. Our main result shows that, when the specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491715

Repeated Nash implementation

Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 249-285

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We de?ne dynamic mono- tonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost suf?cient for repeated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704811

A game model of people's participation in forest management in Northern India

Lise, Wietze - 2002

People have a marginal role in managing forests located in the vicinity of their villages inNorthern India. This situation is scrutinised in this paper by studying strategic play of forestusers. Thereto, a 1 versus n−1 game of people's participation in forest management is estimatedfor three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597989

Starting small to communicate

Atakan, Alp; Koçkesen, Levent; Kubilay, Elif - 2018

We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795331

An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring

Abreu, Dilip; Sannikov, Yuliy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 313-338

Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains over the existing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599513

An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring

Abreu, Dilip; Sannikov, Yuliy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019212