We study competition between political parties in repeated elections with probabilistic voting, allowing a multidimensional policy space and multiple political parties. This model entails multiple equilibria. When parties hold different opinions on some policy, they may take different policy...

In the current mobile world, repeated relationships ("communities") must be self-sustained. We formulate a framework in which some or all players strategically choose whether to terminate or repeat an N-person game. A dynamic game ends when a certain number of players choose termination. To...

There is a widespread hope that, in the near future, algorithms become so sophisticated that ``solutions" to most problems are found by machines. In this note, we throw some doubts on this expectation by showing the following impossibility result: given a set of finite-memory, finite-iteration...

This study employs a finitely repeated binary investment (trust) experiment to examine the exogenous gradualism mechanism-increasing the investment stake slowly rather than imposing a high stake immediately-in trustor-trustee cooperation building. We propose a behavioral model with reciprocal...

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability and character skills influence behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive...

In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start out with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results reported in the social psychology literature. However, safety concerns quickly give way to teams cooperating significantly more than individuals....

A durable good monopolist faces a continuum of heterogeneous customers who make purchase decisions by comparing present and expected price-quality offers. The monopolist designs a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We consider the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a game...

I apply Kandori, Mailath and Rob (Econometrica, 1993) evolutionary dynamic to undiscounted finitely repeated two player games, without common interests. I find an Evolutionary “Folk Theorem” under slightly more restrictive conditions that are required for a standard “Folk Theorem”...