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Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066076
This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110135
This paper studies the interaction between coordination and social learning in a dynamic regime change game. Social … learning provides public information, to which players overreact due to the coordination motive. Coordination affects the … herding disappears, and thus coordination is almost surely successful …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008554
prospects of cooperation, and to different degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771133
We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478988
We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702316
We study impersonal exchange, and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158850
In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can …, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether … are rare. Thus, even in a world of simple learning agents, coordination behavior can take on some surprising forms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515836
Compliance inspection is a detailed examination procedure for determining compliance of a particular person or organisation with the given set of provisions (in regulations, standards, business rules, etc.). The optimal selection of persons or organisations and provisions for inspection is one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013290870
under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782121