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This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018397
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028016
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071298
We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower … this result attenuates with contest experience. Theory also predicts more cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests … compared to finitely repeated contests of the same expected length, and we find empirical support for this. Finally, theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852873
The indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (IRPD) captures the trade-off between the short-term payoff from exploiting economic partners and the long-term gain from building successful relationships. We aim to understand more about how people form and use beliefs about others in the IRPD. To...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828257
A strategy profile in a repeated game has L bounded recall if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724173
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729368
Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009) studies the Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (VSRPD); a random matching game where an agent voluntarily chooses whether to terminate his/her current partnership or not. Based on the VSRPD, we consider the hybrid society, in which some agents are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929712
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315551
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. These situations are often strategic, where the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the deter-minants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. We run a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014543708