We extend public goods game and design transboundary public goods game which players receive more information from the local group, and marginal return per capital (MPCR) is heterogeneous across local groups that high MPCR among local groups and low MPCR among counter groups. We experimentally...

This paper studies extensive-form correlation in discounted infinitely repeated games with public monitoring. We propose two extensions of Fudenberg et al.'s (Econometrica 62:997--1040, 1994) notion of a perfect public equilibrium: the notion of a perfect public correlated equilibrium for games...

We propose an extension to smooth fictitious play and prove that play converges to an ε-Markov perfect equilibrium with probability one in a class of stochastic games known as Markov potential games. We then prove a partial Folk theorem for repeated games under one-period perfect monitoring. We...

This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov...

This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games — the absence of empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in opponents’ behavior and to comply with the...

This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and...

We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...

This paper investigates the Harsanyi-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods....

We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find that heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding...