We study firms' voluntary disclosures in a world of potential information leaks. We find that managers adapt their disclosure strategy to the likelihood and expected scope of leaks. An increasing likelihood fosters voluntary disclosure if leaks merely expose the manager's information endowment...

Prior literature suggests that investors react less strongly to information in less readable disclosures. We extend this literature by considering how disclosure readability affects the sensitivity of investors' valuation judgments to the information contained in outside (i.e., non-firm) sources...

Financial executives of firms engaged in forward contracting have raised concerns that mandated disclosure of those contracts would reveal proprietary information to rival firms. This paper considers the basis for those concerns in the framework of a duopoly in which one privately informed...

Lending decisions of banks is a function of accounting information of borrowing firms, however, in contemporary times the quality of their accounting information is not encouraging to be used as a yardstick in taking lending decision. Against this backdrop, we investigated the impact of...

Technological advancements have lowered the cost for investors to acquire information. We study implications of a lower information acquisition cost in a model where investors' private information production and the manager's behind-the-scenes project management activities are jointly...