We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor's product-market...

In this paper, we examine how the emergence of voluntary disclosure standards can alter the nature of information available to capital market participants. Using industry-specific dictionaries of sustainability terms contained in voluntary disclosure standards developed by the Sustainability...

The so-called disclosure principle is a 'puzzle' in the accounting literature: Game theoretic models of financial markets show that in equilibrium firms should disclose all their private information. Yet, the result is not convincing. Researchers have therefore built sophisticated models in...

Theoretical research on internal capital markets suggests an important role for internal information quality in the capital allocation process within conglomerates. Direct empirical evidence, however, has been sparse, largely because informational frictions inside firms are difficult for...

In a recent survey of analysts, 96% claim that returns are not very useful as earnings forecast model inputs. I find, though, that analysts actually do incorporate returns into their earnings forecasts, even if those returns have no underlying earnings information. This leads to forecast error,...

Our study addresses whether integrated report quality, IRQ, is positively associated with greater price informativeness and the extent to which the greater price informativeness is diminished when firms have higher proprietary costs of disclosure. In integrated reports, firms integrate financial...

We consider a two-period LEN-type agency problem. The principal needs to implement one out of two accounting systems. One emphasizes relevance, the other reliability. Both systems produce identical inter-temporally correlated signals. The relevant system reports an accounting signal in the...

Executive compensation contracts use information from markets and accounting to elicit efficient incentives. We structurally estimate the contribution of each performance to quantify the relative importance of price versus accounting. For plausible risk-aversion coefficients consistent with the...

In capital markets, information disclosure is required to reduce information asymmetry among investors. On the other hand, information held by some market participants is useful for firms' decision making, and the feedback effect, in which information is obtained from prices and used for...

This paper studies the effects of hedge disclosure requirements on corporate risk management and product market competition. The analysis is based on a simple model of market entry and shows that incumbent firms engage in risk management when these activities remain unobserved by outsiders. The...