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Religious Identity and the Provision of Public Goods: Evidence from the Indian Princely States.

Chaudhary, Latika; Rubin, Jared - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

in the religion of rulers in the Indian Princely States in the early 20th century. The Indian Princely States had … significant variation in the religion of the ruler (primarily Hindu and Muslim), often due to unique historical experiences. Using … data from the 1911 census, we fin d that Muslim-ruled states had lower Hindu literacy but the religion of the ruler had no …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699800

Zakat: changing the framework of giving

Al-Bawwab, Rania - In: Islamic economic studies 30 (2023) 2, pp. 86-103

Purpose - This paper aims to show that zakat solves the collective action problem by changing the framework of giving. An additional purpose of this paper is an attempt to fill a critical gap in the Islamic economics literature. This gap concerns the nature and role of zakat in effectively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014420265

Zakat : A Case Study of Constraining Free Riding in Charity

Al-Bawwab, Rania - 2021

When the private incentives faced by individuals in a society are not properly aligned with their shared goals, a collective action problem arises. This paper focuses on the free-rider problem of aid, the collective action problem of getting people to contribute privately to charity. It examines...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217120

Religious identity and the provision of public goods : evidence from the Indian Princely States

Chaudhary, Latika; Rubin, Jared - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010205993

Informative voting and the Samuelson rule

Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2006

We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374864

Members, joiners, free-riders, supporters

Ansink, Erik; Withagen, Cees - 2016

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444079

Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public good : learning to be a free rider

Clemens, Christiane; Riechmann, Thomas - 2001

This paper explores the question whether boundedly rational agents learn to behave optimally when asked to voluntarily contribute to a public good. The decision process of individuals is described by an Evolutionary Algorithm. We analyze the learning process of purely and impurely altruistic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525818

Conditional vs. voluntary contribution mechanism : an experimental study

Reischmann, Andreas - 2015

The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision gives all agents the possibility to condition their contribution on the total level of contribution provided by all agents. In this experimental study the mechanism's performance is compared to the performance of the Voluntary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504663

The conditional contribution mechanism for the provision of public goods

Reischmann, Andreas - 2015

Many mechanisms have been designed to solve the free-rider problem in public good environments. The designers of those mechanisms focused on good static equilibrium properties. In this paper, I propose a new mechanism for the provision of public goods that has good dynamic properties instead....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504666

Why people obey the law : experimental evidence from the provision of public goods

Feld, Lars P.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2002

According to economists, severe legal sanctions deter violations of the law. According to legal scholars, people may obey law backed by mild sanctions because of norm-activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild and severe legal sanctions in the provision of public goods. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408944

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