Japan's 2002 reforms to the Commercial Code have been widely touted as introducing US-style corporate governance to Japan in the form of corporate officers and committee structures for large corporations. This article argues that these reforms have three apparent problems: (i) they are optional...

For decades, a cadre of Japanese corporate governance experts has perpetually claimed that Japan would inevitably develop a vigorous US-style market for hostile takeovers. Recently, this rhetoric has increased as a number of luminaries in the field have drawn strained comparisons between the de...

Two of the most prominent Japanese corporate governance scholars, Professors Miwa and Ramseyer (‘M&R'), have recently published numerous articles and a book setting out their contrarian free-market theory of Japanese corporate governance. According to their theory, contemporary Japanese...

Two of the most prominent Japanese corporate governance scholars, Professors Miwa and Ramseyer (“M&R”), have recently published numerous articles and a book setting out their contrarian free-market theory of Japanese corporate governance. According to their theory, contemporary Japanese...

The debate over corporate governance convergence has been heated for years and has created a cottage industry of experts. It is premised on the false assumption that American corporate governance has reached the end of its evolution by adopting a shareholder primacy and dispersed shareholding...

It is widely assumed that hostile takeovers are a prerequisite for an efficient system of corporate governance. This assumption is false. Since the new millennium, Japan has transformed itself from being on the brink of one of the largest economic meltdowns in modern economic history to...

This Article uses the derivative action in Asia as a lens for re-evaluating the foundational theories of Asian and comparative corporate law. It begins by demonstrating that the cultural theory of “Asian non-litigiousness” provides scant explanatory or predictive value for either the...

State owned enterprises are generally regarded as inefficient firms because of political objectives, external interference, and corruption. Notwithstanding this, studies have shown that Singapore state owned enterprises exhibit higher valuations than those of non-GLCs after controlling for firm...