Institutional investors exhibit substantial home-state bias in private equity. This effect is particularly pronounced for public pension fund investments in venture capital and real estate. Public pension funds achieve performance on in-state investments that is 2-4 percentage points lower than...

Representation on pension fund boards by state officials — often determined by statute decades past — is negatively related to the performance of private equity investments made by the pension fund, despite state officials' relatively strong financial education and experience. Their...

Institutional investors of all types exhibit substantial home-state bias when investing in private equity (PE) funds. This effect is particularly pronounced for public pension funds, where the local overweighting amounts to 9.7% of the private equity portfolio on average, based on 5-year rolling...

Institutional investors exhibit substantial home-state bias in private equity. This effect is particularly pronounced for public pension funds, where overweighting amounts to 9.8% of aggregate private-equity investments and 16.5% for the average limited partner. Public pension funds' in-state...

Institutional investors of all types exhibit substantial home-state bias when investing in private equity (PE) funds. This effect is particularly pronounced for public pension funds, where the local overweighting amounts to 9.7% of the private equity portfolio on average, based on 5-year rolling...