of experimentation is suboptimal, taking decisions by direct democracy, or electing risk-loving politicians, could …

to examine the income reporting behaviour of politicians from across a wide range of wealth spectrums. The new dataset …

avoid tax increases in election years. These data contain 3 useful attributes: (1) when state politicians enact tax laws, (2 … implemented tax changes relative to non-election years. We find some evidence that politicians are most likely to enact tax …We use new annual data on gasoline taxes and corporate income taxes from U.S. states to analyze whether politicians …

avoid tax increases in election years. Our data provide three items of information: (1) when state politicians enact tax …We use new annual data on gasoline taxes and corporate income taxes from U.S. states to analyze whether politicians … laws, (2) when state politicians implement tax laws on consumers and firms, and (3) the size of tax changes. Using a …

accountability when officeholders need not stand for re-election. We show that the name market could mitigate both issues. On the one … hand, acquiring a good name screens good politicians; on the other hand, earning a good name incentivizes old politicians …. The political accountability problem is solvable because of the selection problem. Transparency of a politician’s type …

accountability when officeholders need not stand for re-election. We show that the name market could mitigate both issues. On the one … hand, acquiring a good name screens good politicians; on the other hand, earning a good name incentivizes old politicians …. The political accountability problem is solvable because of the selection problem. Transparency of a politician’s type …