In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region where the game is a prisoner's dilemma: firms still invest in R&D but they would obtain a higher profit by not investing at all. In a repeated version of the game, we prove that firms implicitly...

We compare the strategic potential of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Customer Orientation (CO) as commitments to larger quantities in Cournot competition, modeled as a multi-stage game. First, in addition to profits, firms can choose to care for the surplus of either all consumers...

We compare the strategic potential of Corporate Social Responsibility and Customer Orientation as commitments to larger quantities in Cournot competition. In addition to profits, firms can choose to care for the surplus of either all consumers (CSR) or their own customers only (CO), and if so,...

We compare the strategic potential of Corporate Social Responsibility and Customer Orientation as commitments to larger quantities in Cournot competition. In addition to profits, firms can choose to care for the surplus of either all consumers (CSR) or their own customers only (CO), and if so,...