This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies. -- epistemic game theory ; epistemic...

This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets. -- Epistemic game theory ; epistemic stability ; rationalizability ;...

This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...

We characterize strategy sets that are closed under rational behavior (curb) in extensive games of perfect information and finite horizon. It is shown that any such game possesses only one minimal curb set, which necessarily includes all its subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Applications of this...

This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of...

We fuse a social dilemma game and a game pitting the group against nature, where the group's probability of avoiding disaster depends on the resources it raises from members. The result is the Nederlander-Prisoner's Dilemma Game where the cost of failure is equally shared. We introduce the...

In modern elections, ideologically motivated candidates with a wealth of information about individual voters and sophisticated campaign strategies are faced by voters who lack awareness of some political issues and are uncertain about the exact political positions of candidates. We study to what...