There are countries that do not fall under the prevailing definitions of developed and developing country that are employed by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO fails to take into account the special circumstances and needs of these countries. While such special circumstances and needs...

We review theoretical and empirical work on the economic effects of the United States and China trade relations during the last decades. We first discuss the origins of the China shock, its measurement, and present methods used to study its economic effects on different outcomes. We then focus...

GeoDist makes available the exhaustive set of gravity variables used in Mayer and Zignago (2005). GeoDist provides several geographical variables, in particular bilateral distances measured using citylevel data to assess the geographic distribution of population inside each nation. We have...

Trade and investment can be effective means of implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. However, stand-alone trade and investment liberalization policies aimed at enhancing economic development may have negative side-effects on non-economic facets of sustainable development. As...

We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by the cartel's incentive compatibility constraint (ICC),...

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

In this paper we examine how trade liberalization affects collusive stability in the context of multimarket interactions. The model we consider is a segmented-markets duopoly in which price-setting firms pool their incentive constraints across markets to sustain their most collusive outcome. We...

A deranged publisher decided to produce a volume of some of my papers and asked me to write some comments. Since these amount to a summary of my views about international trade theory over the latest forty years or so, I'm giving the comments a separate alternative existence as a discussion paper

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

Rethinking developing country status at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is essential for the institution's modernization and survival. The Trump administration has recognized this challenge and is seeking changes to the flexibilities provided to developing countries. Referred to as “special...