We present a model of asset valuation in which short-selling is achieved by searching for security lenders and by bargaining over the terms of the lending fee. If lendable securities are di cult to locate, then the price of the security is initially elevated, and expected to decline over time....

We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or...

We study the impact on asset prices of illiquidity associated with search and bargaining in an economy in which agents can trade only when they find each other. Marketmakers' prices are higher and bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can find each other more easily. Prices become Walrasian as...

This paper studies trade in repeated auction markets. We show, for conditionally independent signals, that an owner s decision to sell, expected prices, and continuation values are the same for a large class of auction mechanisms, extending the Revenue Equivalence Theorem to a multi-period...

An important feature of financial markets is that securities are traded repeatedly by asymmetrically informed investors. We study how current and future adverse selection affect the required return. We find that the bid-ask spread generated by adverse selection is not a cost, on average, for...

We study how intermediation and asset prices are affected by illiquidity associated with search and bargaining. We compute explicitly marketmakersamp;rsqou; bid and ask prices in a dynamic model with strategic agents. Bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can more easily find other investors or...

We provide the impact on asset prices of trade by search and bargaining. Under natural conditions, prices are higher if investors can find each other more easily, if sellers have more bargaining power, or if the fraction of qualified owners is greater. If agents face risk limits, then higher...

We study the impact on asset prices of illiquidity associated with search and bargaining in an economy in which agents can trade only when they find each other. Marketmakers' prices are higher and bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can find each other more easily. Prices become Walrasian as...

We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more...

We model how investors allocate between asset managers, managers choose their portfolios of multiple securities, fees are set, and security prices are determined. The optimal passive portfolio is linked to the “expected market portfolio,” while the optimal active portfolio has elements of...