In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and...

High levels of clustering—the tendency for two nodes in a network to share a neighbor—are ubiquitous in economic and social networks across different applications. In addition, many real-world networks show high payoffs for nodes that connect otherwise separate network regions, representing...

This paper shows that the relationship between social networks and cooperative trading is a two-way street. The possibility of cooperative trading enforced by third-party sanctions provides players with incentives to form costly links, and investing in costly links increases the power of...

Drawing upon the science of complexity we propose a network-centric, complex-systems internationalization (NCCSI) perspective of firm internationalization that can help us understand observed patterns of internationalization that are difficult to explain using traditional theories. While...

We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set...

In order to understand the different characteristics observed in real-world networks, one needs to analyze how and why networks form, the impact of network structure on agents' outcomes, and the evolution of networks over time. For this purpose, we combine a network game introduced by Ballester...

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's (Games and Economic Behavior,...

In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the "with whom") and the strategy ("the how") of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of...

We consider a natural generalization of Jackson and Wolinsky's (J Econ Theory 71:44- 74, 1996) connections model where the quality or strength of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a non-decreasing function of that amount. The information that the nodes receive...