We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods.This provides a theoretical underpinning for the so-called "Bertrand paradox" and also generalizes earlier results on mixed-strategy Nash...

We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the so-called "Bertrand paradox" and also generalizes earlier results on mixed-strategy...

This paper is part I of a two-part paper. It proposes a two-stage game to analyze imperfect competition of producers in zonal power markets with a day-ahead and a real-time market. We consider strategic producers in both markets. They need to take both markets into account when deciding what to...

It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves...

In this paper, we fully characterize the Nash Equilibrium in the winner-take-all Bertrand Game, showing that a mixed strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium, if and only if it is a zero operating profit one, and there exist at least two players whose bids are all unprofitable. Compared with...

Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable...

We provide a review of the types of equilibria typically found in operations management inventory papers and a discussion on when the commonly used stationary infinite-horizon (open-loop) equilibrium may be sufficient for study. We focus particularly on order-up-to and basestock equilibria in...

This paper studies an exchange economy with a finite number of agents in which each agent is initially endowed with a finite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the core equivalence theorem may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in...

We consider dynamic stochastic economies with heterogeneous agents and introduce the concept of uniformly self-justified equilibria (USJE)---temporary equilibria for which forecasts are best uniform approximations to a selection of the equilibrium correspondence. In a USJE, individuals'...

This paper investigates the existence of unique equilibrium in two-good economies where agents have preferences with the same relative risk aversion and different utility weights. Aggregate demand behavior is characterized in terms of both macrolevel and micro-level information inherent in the...