Rank-order relative-performance evaluation, in which pay, promotion and symbolic awards depend on the rank of workers in the distribution of performance, is ubiquitous. Whenever firms use rank-order relative-performance evaluation, workers receive feedback about their rank. Using a real-effort...

Rank-order relative-performance evaluation, in which pay, promotion and symbolic awards depend on the rank of workers in the distribution of performance, is ubiquitous. Whenever firms use rank-order relative-performance evaluation, workers receive feedback about their rank. Using a real-effort...

Rank-order relative-performance evaluation, in which pay, promotion and symbolic awards depend on the rank of workers in the distribution of performance, is ubiquitous. Whenever firms use rank-order relative-performance evaluation, workers receive feedback about their rank. Using a real-effort...

Eine gelebte Vertrauenskultur ist ein wichtiger Wettbewerbsvorteil für Unternehmen. Vor allem in Zeiten von Digitalisierung und zunehmender Komplexität bildet Vertrauen eine Grundlage für erfolgreiche Zusammenarbeit. Wenn hingegen Kontrollen und Compliance die Kultur eines Unternehmens...

We study gender differences in relation to performance and sabotage in competitions. While we find no systematic gender differences in performance in the real effort task, we observe a strong gender gap in sabotage choices in our experiment. This gap is rooted in the uncertainty about the...

We analyze self-selection decisions regarding teamwork both theoretically and empirically. While we focus on individual talent, we also investigate the effects of team tasks, individual teamwork skills, and expectations concerning the talent and teamwork skills of potential teammates as further...

We investigate how workers' performance is affected by the timing of wages in a real-effort experiment. In all treatments agents earn the same wage sum but wage increases are distributed differently over time. We find that agents work harder under increasing wage profiles if they do not know...

We investigate how workers' performance is affected by the timing of wages in a real-effort experiment. In all treatments agents earn the same wage sum but wage increases are distributed differently over time. We find that agents work harder under increasing wage profiles if they do not know...

This study investigates the separate and joint effects of prior knowledge and accountability on performance in the information search phase of a tax research task. An experiment is reported in which 63 tax professionals performed a computer-based tax research task. The results indicate that...