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Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts

Stark, Johanna - 2020

Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330

Differences in CEO Compensation Under Institutional and Large Shareholder Ownership

Tosun, Onur Kemal - 2019

Using the most recent data available, I examine the influence of large shareholders and institutional investors on different components of CEO compensation. Increased large shareholder ownership reduces total pay and current elements of incentive compensation, i.e. option, stock, and bonus pay,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900211

The Economics of Managerial Taxes and Corporate Risk-Taking

Armstrong, Chris - 2019

We examine the relation between managers' personal income tax rates and their corporate investment decisions. Using … plausibly exogenous variation in federal and state tax rates, we find a positive relation between managers' personal tax rates … managers' tax rates — we do not find similar relations for middle-income tax rates. We also find that the tax-induced risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900786

The Salience of Creditors' Interests and CEO Compensation

Akins, Brian - 2019

This paper shows that firms adjust CEO compensation policies when creditors' interests are more salient. This effect helps explain controversial compensation practices such as weak performance incentives and short pay duration. Our findings also show that to mitigate the agency cost of debt,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901896

The Effect of CEO Option Compensation on the Capital Structure : A Natural Experiment

Tosun, Onur Kemal - 2019

CEO option compensation and the capital structure decision are simultaneously made choices. Using the Internal Revenue Code 162(m) tax law as an exogenous shock to compensation structure in a natural experiment setting, I can identify firm leverage changes as a result of CEO option compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904713

Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation

Agrawal, Anup - 2019

We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906210

The Effect of Executive Stock Option Delta and Vega on the Spin-Off Decision

Mazur, Mieszko - 2018

We investigate the role of CEO incentives around asset restructuring known as corporate spin-off. More specifically, we focus on executive stock option delta and vega vis-à-vis changes in firm value and firm riskiness in response to the corporate spin-off. Controlling for self-selection of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012908148

Managerial Incentives and IPO Failure Risk

Colak, Gonul - 2019

IPO firms with high-powered CEO incentive contracts have lower failure rates in the aftermarket. Economically, an interquartile change in the distribution of CEO pay translates in a reduction of the failure risk probability by approximately 21%. The Pay Gap between the CEO and its subordinate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898102

CEO Attributes, Compensation, and Firm Value : Evidence from a Structural Estimation

Page, T. Beau - 2018

I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) compensation and eﬀort provision. I ﬁnd that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in ﬁrm value. The primary drivers of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935607

Does Debt Concentration Depend on the Risk-Taking Incentives in CEO Compensation?

Castro, Paula - 2018

Coordination problems amongst creditors are reduced when a firm's debt structure is concentrated in fewer debt types. Using a sample of US non-financial firms, we show that an increase in risk-taking incentives in CEO pay is associated with a greater debt concentration by debt type. This result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935914